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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
Energy, being a very important aspect of international relations and a crucial element 
for the enhancement of national security, has both economic and geopolitical signifi-
cance for consumer, producer and transit countries. In the course of last years the 
European Union (EU) – Russia energy relations, and in particular the conflictual as-
pects of the Energy Dialogue (ED) and the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) have been 
paid much attention. The aim of this essay is to find out the reasons for conflict 
emergence which can contribute to the deeper understanding of EU-Russia energy 
relations. In order to conduct the research I examine and discuss the legal framework 
of the EU-Russia energy relations including the conflictual issues. Then I analyze 
these issues with the help of Sergei Prozorov’s innovative theory of understanding 
conflict emergence which approaches conflict between the parties from an impartial 
standpoint. With the help of the interpretative model I came to the conclusion that the 
reason for conflict emergence is the clash of the deployed logics behind the opted for 
foreign policies of the EU and Russia which is conditioned by the asymmetrical inte-
gration and the difficulty of the respective parties to recognize each others interests as 
legitimate. The asymmetrical interdependence is found to be the factor that intensifies 
the conflictual issues. 
 
Keywords: European Union, Russia, Conflictual Issues of Energy Relations, Energy 
Dialogue, Energy Charter Treaty 
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  1 Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
Energy is a vital element for human life and therefore access to its supply is crucial 
for the sustainability of modern societies. Throughout human history the demand for 
energy has continuously risen. Today, the societies heavily rely on fossil fuels to 
meet their energy demand – fossil fuels such as oil, gas and coal provide almost 80% 
of global energy demand. Continuous use of fossil fuels presents multiple challenges 
to the world community such as environmental, economic, geo-political and military 
conflicts. 
       In order to deal with these challenges the cooperation/integration between sig-
nificant energy producer and consumer countries is seen as an important factor con-
tributing to the establishment of sustainable environment and the ensuring of energy 
security.   
       The European Union (EU) and Russia is an example of the complex interplay of 
such cooperation where on the one hand there is a realization of mutual dependency 
and on the other hand contradictory visions on how to deal with the challenges of en-
ergy related issues. 
 
 
1.1 Research Subject 
 
Energy is an important aspect of the overall EU-Russian relations. Already in the end 
of 1960s the Soviet Union started its supplies of energy to Western Europe under 
long-term agreements. In this field in more than in any other EU and Russia have mu-
tual interests. Today 60% of Russia’s oil exports go the EU, representing over 25% of 
total EU oil consumption. In addition, 50% of Russia’s natural gas exports arrive in 
the EU, representing over 40% of total EU natural gas consumption.  Also, Russia is 
an important supplier of nuclear fuels to the EU.1 The realization of this interdepen-
dency led to the establishment of the bilateral ‘Energy Dialogue’ (ED) in the year 
2000. The purpose of this initiative is to pay attention to and deal with the “issues of 
common interest related to the energy sector”.2 In spite of the promising character of 
this initiative and the realization of the need for strategic energy partnership as well 
as mutual concern on crucial issues of energy security the progress has been modest if 
                                                 
1 International Herald Tribune 
2 Johnson. D&Robinson. Paul, Perspectives on EU-Russia Relations, (2005), p. 27 
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not slow where the energy links are still limited to simple producer-consumer rela-
tions.  
From the EU perspective dependency on Russia in energy supplies, the security of 
these supplies, environmental issues and liberalization of energy sector are the drivers 
of the EU’s energy policy towards Russia. From the Russian perspective, the security 
of markets for oil and gas, the critical relations with the so called transit countries 
(Belorussia, Ukraine) and the nationalization of the energy sector is of vital impor-
tance for Russia’s national security and economic development.  
       The numerous issues where the EU and Russia continue to disagree on are eco-
nomic and geopolitical in nature.The culmination of these conflicting positions is re-
flected in the negotiations on the ratification of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) 
where the future development of the energy security issues depend to a large extent 
on the ability of the two parties to find common solutions appropriate for both sides. 
 
 
1.2 Questions and Purpose of Research 
 
This paper is a descriptive and explanatory research which is aimed at deeper under-
standing of the EU-Russia energy relations and specifically the explanation of why 
the conflictual issues occur. Therefore the main question of this paper is defined as 
follows:  
 
      Why do the conflictual issues in EU-Russia energy relations occur/have oc-
curred? 
  
In order to answer the main question this paper will consist of a descriptive part fol-
lowed by an explanatory part. 
By providing descriptive research this paper aims to present an in-depth examination 
of the specific details of EU-Russia energy partnership where the conflictual issues 
will be examined. In this respect the sub-questions of this paper are the following: 
      Why is the energy sector of importance for the EU and Russia? 
How is the energy cooperation perceived by the EU and Russia respectively?   
What is the role of the ED and the ECT in the EU-Russia energy relations? 
What are the conflictual issues within the EU-Russia energy relations?   
 
The descriptive part of the paper is an important supplement to the explanatory re-
search of this paper as it provides an important basis for further analysis and interpre-
tation of the conflictual issues in order to answer the main research question of this-
paper. 
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1.3 Methodology and Structure 
 
This paper is a qualitative research which consists of three parts: theoretical, empiri-
cal and analytical. Each of the parts will be conveyed through the usage of different 
qualitative methods such as textual analysis of documents, as well as case studies of 
the particular aspects of the EU-Russia energy partnership, namely the ECT the ED.  
       The theoretical part of this paper is aimed at providing a useful theoretical 
framework which is constructed on the theories necessary for the answering and ex-
plaining of the research question. This paper adopts a deductive approach to theoriz-
ing the ideas about social phenomena. The essence of the deductive approach sug-
gests that the researcher starts with an abstract logical relationship among theoretical 
concepts then tests the ideas against concrete empirical evidence. 3   
      In order to achieve a maximum explanatory value in particular cases the re-
searcher has to combine several theoretical models in order to create one comprehen-
sive framework.4 In this respect, the theory of interdependence and an interpretative 
model are used for the analysis of the conflictual issues within the EU-Russia energy 
relations. The ambition of this paper is to apply and test an innovative theory to the 
understanding of the emergence and development of conflicts between the EU and 
Russia developed by Sergei Prozorov (a professor of International Relations at Petro-
zavodsk State University, Russia) by applying an interpretative model of conflict 
emergence to the particular field of the EU-Russia relations- energy relations.5  
       The empirical part of this paper is aimed at providing an empirical research of 
the EU-Russia energy partnership developments starting with the examination and 
discussion of the respective energy situations of the EU and Russia which provides 
necessary background for the understanding of legal framework of the EU- Russia. 
This is followed by the examination of the ED and the ECT. Within this part the con-
flictual issues of the EU- Russia energy relations will be examined and discussed. In 
this chapter the method of critical analysis of the primary and secondary sources will 
be used. The case study method with its aim “to describe the unit of analysis in-depth, 
in detail, in context and holistically”6 will be used for the examination of the ED and 
the ECT. 
       The analytical part of this paper is aimed at providing an analytical research of 
the reasons for the emergence of the conflictual issues presented in the empirical part. 
In order to answer the main question of this paper and to provide necessary explana-
tory grounds the ambition of this part is to analyze the empirical findings with the 
help of the suggested theoretical framework. In this respect the conflictual issues will 
be analyzed from the perspective of the opposition of the logics of sovereignty and 
                                                 
3 Neuman. W. L, Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Methods, (2003), Pearson 
Education Inc., pp. 50-51 
4 Roman.M, The Implementation of International Regimes: The Case of Amazon Cooperation Treaty, 
(1998), Uppsala, p. 114 
5 Prozorov. S, Understanding Conflict between Russia and the EU: The Limits of Integration, (2006), 
Palgrave Mcmillan 
6 Patton. Q. M, How to Use Qualitative Methods in Evaluation, (1987), Sage Publications, p. 19 
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integration i.e. through the interpretative model of conflict. The analysis of the EU-
Russia interdependence in energy will be done with the help of the theory of interde-
pendence.  
       In the concluding chapter the main findings will be summarized and the sugges-
tion for the further research in the field of EU-Russia energy relations will be given. 
 
 
1.4 Delimitations and clarification 
 
Before the main research is conducted it is important to mention some delimitations 
of this paper. Since the main aim of theory is to explain some social phenomena it is 
important for the researcher to present a relevant theoretical framework for the analy-
ses of a specific issue within the particular field of research. The choice of theoretical 
approaches cannot be right or wrong but rather evaluated in terms of being more or 
less useful.  
       The chosen theoretical framework of this paper is not aimed at giving all encom-
passing explanations of the emergence of conflictual issues of the EU-Russia energy 
relations, since there are a number of theories that can provide different explanations. 
The study of the conflictual issues is delimited to the analysis from the perspective of 
the opposition between the deployed logics (sovereign and integrationalist) behind 
the choice of foreign energy policies of the EU and Russia. Another delimitation of 
the research is that the conflictual issues of the ECT (Transit Protocol) are analyzed 
in detail and other issues more in general. The reasons for this are: first, the ECT is 
one of the central issues in the EU-Russia energy relations which represents the most 
disputable aspect that can exemplify the whole pattern of conflict emergence in the 
EU-Russia energy relations in the energy field and second, it would require a much 
more extensive research to analyze in detail all the existing conflictual issues.   
       There are some aspects that need to be clarified before the research is carried out. 
 In this paper the EU is treated as a ‘sovereign entity’ (though not a state) which acts 
as a single actor in bilateral energy relations with Russia and as a result can have its 
own ‘sovereign interests’.  
       The choice of interdependence theory is dictated by the fact that EU-Russia en-
ergy relations are characterized by a high degree of interdependence and is a neces-
sary theory to analyze the interaction within energy relations and its role in conflict-
ual issues.  
As for the choice of Prozorov’s innovative theory, there are some factors that can 
speak for the relevance of this theoretical model for the research of this paper. 
       First of all, it is a practice-based model of conflict emergence in EU-Russia rela-
tions which adopts the inductive approach in the analysis of particular EU-Russia 
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conflictual issues (i.e. it takes a particular area of relations and analyses it from an 
objective standpoint where none of the parties are pre-given any specific logic behind 
the choice of foreign policies). Another factor that provides useful grounds is that this 
model presents all the logically possible policy outcomes in the interaction of the two 
parties analyzed from the perspective of the opposition of the logics of sovereignty 
and integration.  
       By concluding this part it seems to be appropriate to give some remarks about 
my own motivation for the choice of the interpretative model of conflict emergence 
in the EU-Russia energy relations. While searching for the appropriate theoretical 
model of this study I encountered difficulties in finding a theory that could objec-
tively approach the conflict emergence in the EU-Russia relations. When I finally 
came across Prozorov’s innovative theory I realized that this approach reflects my 
own vision of how the analysis should be carried out. The matter is that this model is 
considered to be an innovative approach which combines insights from both classical 
and contemporary critical theories of international relations. Since it is a relatively 
new model it has not been explored in different areas of EU-Russia relations (it has 
been applied to the examination of the conflictual issues of the EU-Russia cross bor-
der integration and visa and passport regimes). The above mentioned makes it espe-
cially interesting and challenging for me to analyze the EU-Russia energy relations 
from the perspective of this model and to find some new interpretation of the existing 
conflictual issues within this field.  
 
 
1.5 Sources 
 
In order to conduct this study different sources will be used. An important role is 
given to the examination and the discussion of primary sources such as original 
documents such as treaties, agreements and energy policy strategies where the official 
positions of the respective sides are represented. Secondary sources such as books, 
articles, journals which provide insights into the previous research carried out by spe-
cialists in the energy field concerning the EU-Russia energy relationship. In order to 
provide an objective empirical and consequently analytical research the academic 
works of European as well Russian researchers will be used in the course of this 
study.  
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2 Theoretical Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter the relevant theoretical approaches will be presented in order to outline 
a necessary framework for further analysis of the empirical findings of this study.   
 
 
2.1 Interdependence as an Analytic Concept 
 
The notion of interdependence is a widely used concept in the political and economic 
studies of the international relations which attempts to analyze the complexity of co-
operative and conflictual issues in interstate interaction. The notion of interdepend-
ence can be simply understood as “…mutual dependence…where dependence means 
a state of being determined or significantly affected by external forces.”7 In world 
politics interdependence is referred to the situation which is characterized by recip-
rocity of effects among states or among actors within states. As an analytic tool, in-
terdependence was defined by Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane as “where there are 
reciprocal (although not necessarily symmetrical) costly effects of transactions, there 
is interdependence”8 It implies that one state in some way affects the options of at 
least some of the others. As Keohane and Nye stress “the interdependent relations 
will always involve costs, since interdependence restricts autonomy; but it is impos-
sible to specify a priori whether the benefits of a relationship will exceed the costs. 
This will depend on the values of the actors as well as on the nature of the relation-
ship.”9  
       The different patterns of interdependence affect patterns of the cooperation and 
conflict in the international system.10 The analysis of the costs and benefits of any 
interdependent relations brings in focus the fact that interdependence cannot be lim-
ited to a situation of evenly balanced mutual dependence. An uneven distribution of 
the benefits and costs lies in the heart of the asymmetrical interdependence which 
provides a source of power in the bargaining process over an issue for actors in deal-
ing with one another.11 
In order to understand the nature of the asymmetrical interdependence as a source of 
power it is important to look closer at the peculiarities of its dimensions and the ways 
it can be manipulated in order to become a source of power.  
                                                 
7 Keohane O. R & Nye J.S. Power and Interdependence,(2001), Longman, p. 7, 
8 Ibid ,Keohane & Nye, p.8 
9 Ibid, Keohane &Nye, p. 8 
10 Stubbs R. & Underfhill G.R.D. Political Economy and the Changing Global Order,2006, Oxford 
University Press, p. 7 
11 Ibid, Keohane&Nye, p. 9 
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2.1.1 Asymmetrical Interdependence as a Source of Power 
 
Power is defined as the ability of an actor to get others to do something they other-
wise would not do. Keohane and Nye stress that when one considers the asymmetri-
cal interdependence as a source of power one thinks of the power as control over re-
sources, or potential to affect outcomes. In other words, it is a situation when a less 
dependent actor in a relationship often has a significant political resource, because 
changes in the relationship (which actor may be able to initiate or threaten) will be 
less costly to that actor then to its partner.12  
       There are two dimensions that are important for the understanding of the role of 
power in the interdependent relations, these are: sensitivity and vulnerability. Sensi-
tivity involves degrees of responsiveness within a policy framework i.e. “how quickly 
do the changes in one country bring costly changes in another”. The sensitivity inter-
dependence is created by interactions within a framework of policies where the 
framework remains unchanged. Sensitivity interdependence can be social, political or 
economic. 13 
       Vulnerability can be defined as “an actor's liability to suffer costs imposed by 
external events even after policies have been altered” i.e. if the framework of policies 
could be changed and new and very different policies were possible what would be 
the costs of adjusting to the outside change. 14 Vulnerability is particularly important 
for understanding the political structure of interdependence relations. It can affect the 
sociopolitical as well as politico-economic relationships.   
        This theory explains how manipulation of the asymmetrical interdependence can 
provide initial sources of power for either of the actors in the bargaining process over 
an issue. In order to understand the underlying logics behind the foreign policy choice 
of a particular actor as well as how such logics can affect the interdependent interac-
tion bringing either cooperative or conflictual outcomes the interpretative model of 
conflict emergence is adopted in this paper.  
 
 
2.2 Why an Innovative Approach to Conflict Emergence 
in the EU-Russia Relations? 
 
There are several traditional approaches- liberal, institutionalist and cultural- which 
try to explain the conflict emergence and development between the EU-Russia. Pro-
zorov argues that the main disadvantage of these approaches is that “…rather than 
explaining the descent and development of conflict between two parties, they are fre-
quently themselves complicit in the articulation of conflict discourses and thus func-
tion  more in a modality of the explanandum rather then the explanans.”15  
                                                 
12 Ibid, Keohane&Nye, pp.9-10 
13 Ibid, Keohane&Nye, p. 11 
14 Ibib, Keohane&Nye, p.11 
15 Ibid Prozorov, p. 11 
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The author further illustrates this argument by discussing the problematic aspects of 
the traditional approaches in explaining the conflict emergence in the EU-Russia rela-
tions.   
       The liberal approach which dominates the European academic thinking and in-
creasingly being discussed in the Russian academic literature16 is characterized by the 
assumption of the inherently “benevolent nature of Russia’s integration with Europe.” 
The liberalists consider the EU-Russia international relations as a priori conditioned 
by the developments in Russian domestic politics, i.e. the success or failure of liberal 
reforms in Russia.17 It is largely Russia’s own practices in the domestic or interna-
tional arena that are deemed to be conflict-generating. Thus, the main feature of the 
liberal approach to EU-Russian conflict is the “confluence of domestic and interna-
tional factors in the argument that the key conflict-generating factor in the EU-Russia 
relations is the failure or slow progress of liberal reforms in Russia”.18 
       The institutionalist approach points at the underdeveloped institutional frame-
work of the EU-Russia relations as the main source of the conflict. According to Bor-
dachev, in this approach the conflictual issues may be resolved by establishing the 
institutional format of interaction, providing for the better communication between 
respective parties.19 The inefficiency of this approach, as Prozorov points out is that it 
is “incapable of theorizing a situation of substantive political divergence between 
Russia and the EU that takes place in an unproblematic communicative environ-
ment”.20 
       The third approach to interpretation of the EU-Russia relations is cultural. This 
approach emphasizes the existence of the deep-rooted substantive cultural or civiliza-
tional divergences between Russia and the EU that produce conflictual issues. The 
main argument of the cultural approach is based on the “characterization of Russia as 
its historical ‘Other’” where the problems in implementation of liberal reforms is evi-
dence of the overall impossibility of the convergence in the EU-Russia positions. 21 
       These approaches explain conflict emergence in the EU-Russia relations either as 
“Russia’s ‘failure of transition’ to internalize the norms and practices operative 
within the EU” or through positing Russia as a priori ‘Other’ hence the impossibility 
of convergence in the conditions of cultural, ideological, economic, geopolitical and 
spiritual ‘meta-conflict’.22 As Prozorov points out these traditional perspectives on 
EU-Russia relations lack “the analysis of the formation and transformation of con-
                                                 
16 Trenin, D, “The Changing Geopolitical Realities in Europé”, pp.181-184 
17 Op.cit, Prozorov, p. 11 
18 Ibid, Prozorov, p. 13 
19 Bordachev, T, Rossija i Evropeijslij Sojuz:Trebuetsja Departament, 2002, Briffing Moskovskogo 
Centra Carnegie,4/3(translated from Russian); see also  Khudolei K,”Otnoshenia Rossii I Evropeis-
kogo Soyuza:Novye Vozmozhnosti, Novye Problemy” 
20 Op.cit, Prozorov, p. 14 
21Ibid, Prozorov, p.15; see also Narochnitskaya N., Rossiya I Zapad v Novyh Geopolitichaskix Real-
nostyah,2004,  
22 Ibid. Prozorov, p. 15-18; see also Pursiainen Ch. EU-Russia Cooperation- Challenges for the EU, in 
(ed), Knudsen O, Russia and the New Europe, Conference Papers,2006, pp.100-115 
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flictual dispositions in the course of the concrete EU-Russian interfaces that need not 
be determined by the anterior deployment of any given logic by either party “.23 
As for the innovative theory of Prozorov, it combines the assumptions of traditional 
and contemporary theories in approaching the EU-Russia relations in attempt to ex-
plain conflict emergence. This theory argues that conflicts in EU-Russian relations 
are the result of the clash of principles of state sovereignty and international integra-
tion, which characterize the policies of both sides The important factor is that it is a 
practice-based vision of EU-Russia conflictual that views EU-Russian relations as” 
irreducible to any single logic but unfolding in a more dispersed manner, which is 
deployed in different situations.”24 
       In comparison to traditional theories, the innovative approach rests on the de-
scription of the structure of the conflict discourse in question and interprets this struc-
ture with reference to both the policy logics of the two parties and to the interactive 
process of the interface in these logics. This model approaches the conflict as “inter-
face of policy discourses, in which the subject-positions of the parties are incompati-
ble and conflictual dispositions are therefore enunciated or communicated.”25 The 
interpretative model of conflict emergence states that convergences or divergences 
(cooperative of conflictual outcomes) between Russian and EU policy orientations 
may be conditioned by structural or interactional determinants. 
       The structural aspect refers to the foreign policy logic, opted for by both parties 
in relation to each other, where these logics can be either integrationist or sovereign. 
The interpretative model argues that both parties can deploy these two logics in their 
mutual relation, in different issues of their interaction. As Prozorov argues this as-
sumption “paces the facile reading of the EU as squarely 'integration-oriented' and 
Russia zealously assertive of sovereignty”26 and explains my motivations for the 
choice of this model as providing an impartial analysis of the EU-Russia ED conflict-
ual issues. 
       The interactional determinant relates to how the opted for logics relate to each 
other in particular EU-Russia relations, i.e. whether the move of one party is 
'matched' by the other or is ignored or rejected in the deployment of a different logic 
by the other party. These structural aspects can be defined as equivalence and dissent. 
 
2.2.1 Interpretative Model of Conflict Emergence: Integrationist and 
Sovereign Logics 
 
The basic feature of the sovereign logic may be understood in relation to the founda-
tional definition of sovereignty. Sovereignty is manifested in three principles: inde-
pendence, equality and unanimity.27 
                                                 
23 Ibid, Prozorov, p. 20 
24 Ibid, Prozorov, p. 20 
25 Ibid, Prozorov, p.21 
26 Ibid, Prozorov, p. 23  
27 Ibid, Prozorov, p. 76 
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Independence signifies “the particular aspect of the supreme authority of the individ-
ual state which consists in the exclusion of the authority of any other state.” Equality 
follows from the principle of independence: “if all states have supreme authority 
within their territory, none can be subordinated.” The rule of unanimity refers to the 
legislative function of the states in international decision-making: “all states are equal 
regardless of their size, population and power. The rule of unanimity gives each state 
participating in the deliberations and the right to decide whether it wants to be bound 
by the decision.”28  
       Taking into consideration the fundamental definition that sovereignty is a neces-
sary guarantee of a freedom of any political community, both of the Self and Other, 
and, since freedom always opens the possibility of conflict, any political community 
that strives for security must abide in its foreign policy practices by the logic of sov-
ereignty. The fundamental presupposition of the logic of sovereignty adopted in the 
interpretative model is: “a conception of the space of international politics as neces-
sarily open and pluralistic, lacking any kind of universal authority and hence prone to 
conflict between particularistic political communities in the ‘outside’ space of anar-
chy.”29 
       International integration has been historically considered as a ‘peace project’ i.e. 
as a means to make “obsolete the occurrence of wars between sovereign states 
through the creation of a common framework that… creates conditions for a ‘thin’ 
international community, governed by the same rules, norms, and principles”. Coop-
erative interaction leads to the harmonization of policies and domestic identities, 
which make the sovereign state, give way to the ‘international state.’ 30 
To summarize the presuppositions of the logic of integration that the states may de-
ploy in their foreign policy choices Prozorov identifies integrationist logic as: 
“… a conception that displaces the ontological ideal of sovereignty through the estab-
lishment of international linkages, organizations, regimes, institution and other struc-
tures of interaction and cooperation, which are expected to make obsolete the onto-
logical presupposition of the possibility of conflict in international politics.”31 
 
 
 2.2.2 Interactional Determinants  
 
The interactional aspect of the interface relates to how logics, opted for in the foreign 
policies of Russia and the EU, relate to each other in actual EU-Russian encounters. 
Such interactional determinants are defined above as equivalence and dissent. 
       Moves of equivalence refer to the convergence of policy logics, i.e. they indicate 
a match, or compatibility between Russia's and the EU's subject positions. As Pro-
zorov suggests a situation of equivalence need not designate a necessarily cooperative 
                                                 
28 Morgenthau cited in Prozorov, p. 76 
29 Ibid, Prozorov, p. 83 
30 Ibid, Prozorov, pp. 83-90 
31 Ibid, Prozorov, p.93 
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outcome, but the incompatibility of subject positions. Besides the pattern of equiva-
lence between such subject positions of both parties suggests that the parties can ex-
ists in relatively violent context, just as long as both parties in those contexts recog-
nize the legitimacy of each other’s positions and make no attempt to impose their 
own position on the other.32 
       The situation of mismatch between the logics, deployed by the two parties, is 
conflict-generating by definition, since the subject positions of the parties are incom-
patible, which produces a situation of dissent on the part of one or both parties. 
 
 
2.2.3 Matrix of an Interpretative Model 
 
As Prozorov suggests, this theoretical model can be applicable to the analysis of any 
international conflict from the perspective of the opposition between the logics of 
sovereignty and integration. It presents a matrix of four possible avenues of the inter-
face of parties within interaction: the parties in question may opt for either sovereign 
or integrationist logics and these in turn may be reciprocated by gestures of equiva-
lence or dissent by the other party. This model with all possible outcomes is sche-
matically presented in table1.  
Table  1. Interpretative Model of Conflict Emergence 
 
Source, adopted from Prozorov33, (2006) 
 
1. The pattern of mutual delimitation is constituted by the occurrence of equivalence 
of the sovereign logics deployed by both parties. This pattern corresponds to the con-
ventional understanding of foreign policies that constitute the international society of 
                                                 
32 Ibid, Prozorov,pp.96-97 
33 Ibid, Prozorov, p.99 
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sovereign states, in which integrative policies remain limited and do not in any way 
challenge the traditional mode of the constitution of the political community.34 Coop-
eration in this pattern of interface is based on locating the lowest common denomina-
tor in the policy visions of the two parties, which serves as the ground for design and 
implementation of cooperative activities. The central principle is therefore intersub-
jectivity, understood as the assumption of fundamental equality of the two parties in 
communicative process.35 
       2. The equivalence of the integrationist logics deployed by the parties towards 
each other results in the construction of ‘common spaces’, which may take many 
forms, from modest institutionalization of cross-border cooperation to the ultimate 
result of world unification. This pattern is conditioned by mutual consensus of the 
parties to open up their sovereign spaces to each other. In order for the ‘common 
spaces’ to appear this process must be conditioned by symmetric non-hierarchical 
integration. To understand the symmetric integration one should look at the asymmet-
ric integration where there is a ‘subject-object’ asymmetry which contradicts the in-
tentions of both parties to engage in equal intersubjective partnership and rather re-
calls the logic of hierarchical inclusion. In order words, in the mutual interaction 
aimed at integration either of the parties insists on its ‘rules of the game’ and by this 
installs clear division between integrating and integrated. These asymmetries can ap-
pear due to the absence of recognition of legitimate difference which, as Prozorov 
argues, distinguishes the logic of asymmetrical integration from the pattern of mutual 
delimitation of sovereignties.36  
       3. The dissensual reception of the sovereign logic of one party by the other pro-
duces a situation of the ‘exclusion’ of the latter. As exclusionary policies of one party 
encounter the integrationist ambitions of the other, communication of disaccord be-
comes complicated by the exclusion of the differend37, which intensifies the conflict-
ual disposition. The excluded party may perceive the other’s failure to respond in 
kind to its integrative initiatives as an indicator of its being cast as a ‘threat’, while 
the excluding party may consider illegitimate or outright hostile any attempt to un-
couple its own conventional unity by opening it up to the integrative project of a 
‘common space’ with the Other.38  
       4. The dissensual reception of the integrative logic of one party by the other gen-
erates practices of self-exclusion, whereby one attempts to avoid/escape unwelcome 
intrusion into one’s bounded space and one’s incorporation into ‘common space’ of 
the Other.  Communication is threatened by the exclusion of differend, whereby the 
integrative logic of the other is considered in purely negative terms of the ‘assault on 
                                                 
34 Ibid, Prozorov, p. 99 
35 Ibid, Prozorov, p. 138 
36 Ibid, Prozorov, pp. 160-163 
37 Loytard's notion of differend refers to the irreducible remainder, involved in the attempt to render 
the terms of one discourse within another, which entails that every 'inclusion' within a discursive field 
is always conditioned by foundational exclusion of that which in the terms of the system in question 
cannot be expressed. in Prozorov (2006) p. 98  
38 Ibid, Prozorov,p. 100 
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sovereignty’ and the project of a ‘common space’ is rendered equivalent to intrusion 
or occupation.39 
       As the author points out these asymmetric outcomes of integration are mirror im-
ages of each other. The exclusion of one party is equivalent to the self-exclusion of 
the other. The key characteristic of the pattern of dissent is the immediate establish-
ment of the infrastructure of conflict. As the subject positions of the parties in ques-
tion are incompatible, the potential for conflict escalation exists from the beginning. 
The dissenting parties do not recognize each other’s positions as legitimate, rational 
or ethical and therefore do not perceive their own actions, which may obstruct or 
jeopardize these positions as in any way hostile and unjustified.40 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39 Ibid, Prozorov, p. 100 
40 Ibid, Prozorov, pp. 97-98 
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3 The Energy Situations of the EU and Russia 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter proceeds by presenting a necessary background of the EU’s and Russia’s 
energy situations and answering the sub-question of this paper why the energy of im-
portance for the EU and Russia respectively. 
 
 
3.1 The Role of Energy in International Relations 
 
Energy in the form of fossil fuels is vital for the development and sustainability of 
modern society. In previous times in history mankind was not dependent on energy to 
the same extent but with the age of industrialization the consumption started to in-
crease dramatically and continued rising rapidly especially during the past decades. 
Consequently, the growth in global energy demand is considered to rise drastically in 
the future. Such a crucial role for the survival of any country today places the energy 
related issues such as the reduction of fossil fuel reserves, global warming and other 
environmental risks, geopolitical and military conflicts and the rising prices of fuel 
into the category of issues which can easily generate conflicts between the consumer, 
producer and transit countries. 41     
       As a result of the above mentioned factors the energy security is of vital interest 
to states on the international political scene. Therefore, energy is a strategic good 
both for producer as well as consumer countries. In the last couple of years, both 
governments of consumer and producer countries have been concerned with security 
of supply and demand. However, the policies to fulfill their strategic interests differ 
significantly for both parties, because producer countries rely predominantly on gov-
ernment intervention, while consumer countries rely mainly on a market-based ap-
proach with certain government incentives.42 
       There are also distinctions between energy policies of producer and consumer 
countries. In consumer countries the energy policy entails three important elements: 
low supply costs, security of supply (continuity of supply) and the importance of en-
vironmental aspects.43 These crucial factors are shared by to a large extent among 
consumer country’s governments and international organizations. 
                                                 
41 Muneer.M.T.A, “Energy Supply, its Demand and Security Issues for Developed and Emerging 
Economies”, (2005), Elsevier Ltd, Science Direct,   
42 Study on Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics, Final Report, January 2004, by Clingendael In-
ternational Energy Programme (CIEP), The Hague, EU official site  
43 Ibid, Study on Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics, Final Report, January 2004 
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In contrast to consumer countries producer countries rely on energy exports for a 
considerable part of their GDP. This places the energy producer countries in a group 
called resource-based economies which is defined as “economies where natural re-
sources account for more than 10 per cent of GDP and 40 per cent of exports”.44 
       Besides, these countries are facing pressure by consuming countries, which they 
regard as meddling with their ‘internal’ affairs. In addition, subsidies, taxation, as 
well as the costs or revenues of state-owned companies play a significant role in in-
fluencing the country’s budget. All of the elements discussed above regarding the 
role of energy in international relations signify energy as a vital good to nations, 
within the sphere of the geopolitical world order. In this connection, Robert Larsson 
argues that usage of energy policy as a political or economic lever especially by pro-
ducing or transit countries can be achieved through several tools such as: supply in-
terruptions (total or partial), threats of supply interruptions (covertly or explicit), pric-
ing policies, usage of existing energy debts, creating new energy debts and hostile 
takeovers of companies or infrastructure.45 Thus, energy is not only a strategic eco-
nomic good but also a political good. 
       Having presented the main features of the role of energy in international relations 
the next section of this chapter focuses on the respective energy policies of the EU 
and Russia and highlights the significance of energy security i.e. security of supply 
and security of demand and transit for their energy partnership.  
 
 
3.2 The Energy Situation in the EU 
 
The EU is moving towards more increased dependency on imports for oil, gas and 
coal supplies at the same time as renewable and nuclear power is estimated not being 
able to meet this shortfall/deficit. The last two enlargements have contributed to this 
difficult situation in the energy sphere. Since the 1973 and 1979, oil price and supply 
crises the energy supply security has been a prime political and economic concern in 
international relations.46 Thus, as the EU is facing continued deterioration of its en-
ergy security as a result in the decline of indigenous production the extent to which 
the problem will rise depends to what degree renewable energy supplies will develop. 
The forecasts of the European Commission state that the EU’s energy import depend-
ency might rise to 70 % by 2030.47 According to the European Commission this is 
due to the fact that high dependence on oil and gas will continue because even though 
the alternative (sustainable) energy sources will be growing they will still not be able 
                                                 
44 Ahrend.R, “Sustaining Growth in a Resource-based Economy: The Main Issues and the Specific 
Case of Russia”, (2005), Economic Commission for Europe, Geneva, Occasional Paper No. 6, United 
Nations 
45 Larsson.R, “Russia’s Energy Policy: Security Dimension and Russia’s Reliability as an Energy Sup-
plier”, (2006), FOI – Swedish Defence Research Agency, p. 177 
46 Op. cit, Johnson,(2005), p.179 
47 European Commission Final Report  in the Green Paper, (2002) in Debra Johnson, Perspectives on 
EU Russia Relations, (2005), p. 180 
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to satisfy the growing energy demand of the EU. In addition, the distribution of 
proven oil and gas reserves in the world and the advantage of their exploitation indi-
cate that future EU oil and gas supplies will progressively become more geographi-
cally concentrated on Russia, the Caspian Sea region and the Persian Gulf. Therefore, 
in the coming decades security of oil and gas supplies will continue to be an impor-
tant issue. 48   
       To illustrate this point it can be observed that the EU is since many years relying 
on imports for almost 80% of oil supplies and in 2002 the impost came mainly from 
OPEC 38%, Norway 24% and Russia 22%. Thus, as the EU’s dependence on oil im-
ports rises it is estimated that it can reach 90% by 2020 with imports coming from 
unstable and hostile areas. Concerning the gas reserves of the EU they are quite lim-
ited and calculations show that at current production rates they will last 20 years. In 
2001 the EU had to import around 43% of its gas consumption. The same year 39% 
of imports came from Russia, 26% from Norway and 25% from Algeria and 10% 
from other sources. In contrast to oil and gas the EU has large coal reserves but pro-
duction has been to a large extent stopped in several MS due to the large cost of coal 
extraction which is three to four times the world market price of coal. Therefore, the 
governments of the MS do not subsidize domestic production.49 
       The next point of the study will be the recent developments in the EU Energy 
Policy which highlight the critical issues of the European energy security. 
  
 
3.3 The 2007 Energy Policy for Europe 
 
At the 2007 Spring European Council the EU has taken a firm stand on the fight 
against global warming. The heads of state and government of the EU have agreed to 
adopt an Energy Policy for Europe (EPE) which goes further than only having the 
aim of enhancing competitiveness and securing energy supply, and adds strong com-
mitment to save energy and promote climate-friendly energy sources.50  
       Other important initiatives identified in the new EPE are the following: the move 
to competitive and open European electricity and gas markets that would enhance fair 
energy prices and savings if the right policy and legislative would be implemented; 
increasing the use of renewable energy with the aim to triple the share of renewable 
energy from under 7% currently to 20% in 2020; the aim to develop new technologies 
that will help in replacing the oil and gas dependency for the future as they will de-
plete with time or become too expensive; the aim promote solidarity among the MS 
in case of an energy crisis by helping with diversification if a MS is e.g. dependent on 
a single supplier or improving the EU emergency oil stock system, making sure that 
                                                 
48 Ibid, Study on Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics, Final Report, January 2004 
49 The EU Energy and Transport in Figures Official Document, (2003), European Commission, Direc-
torate-General for Energy and Transport  
50 European Commission , “Energy for a Changing World: An Energy Policy for Europe, the need for 
action”, Directorate-General for Energy and Transport, Brussels (2007),   
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nuclear power if used in MS is safe and secure in keeping up the highest standards of 
safety, security and non-proliferation.51 
       As the EU faces increasing import dependency, higher energy prices than before 
and the consequences of climate change the leaders of the EU are stressing that a 
common European position and the ability to speak with one voice on international 
energy issues is crucial in ensuring a sustainable (active combat of the climate 
change), secure (improved coordination of EU’s supply of and demand for energy 
within an international context) and competitive (enhancing the efficiency of the 
European energy grid by creating a truly competitive internal energy market) energy 
supply. 52 Andris Spruds stresses that the present European energy market has under-
gone the ‘paradigm shift’ from being fully state controlled sector to a sector with an 
increasing presence and domination of market forces. However, there are differences 
regarding the degree to which EU countries have liberalized and deregulated their 
energy sectors. That is why it is quite difficult for them to reach common understand-
ing on how to deal with energy related issues especially concerning the security of 
energy supplies. Therefore, as Spruds suggests the MS traditionally prefer to consider 
these security issues as part of their national security.53  
       The issue of the security of energy supplies is vital to the EU and is identified in 
the EPE as well. Studies show that if energy trends and policies remain as they are, 
the EU’s reliance on imports will increase from half to almost two thirds in 2030. In 
this scenario around 84% of gas would have to be imported, compared to 93% of oil. 
However, there are concerns about from where and how these supplies would come. 
In addition, a worrying element is the fact that several EU MS are basically depend-
ent on one single gas supplier i.e. to the most part Russia and, the EU’s realizes that 
this contributes to the growing vulnerability of its energy security.54 
 
3.4 Russian Energy Policy 
Today Russia is a major energy producing and exporting country in the world. It is 
the largest exporter of natural gas and the second exporter of oil in the world.55 
Therefore, energy is undoubtedly the most important sector in the Russian economy 
and plays a central role in its foreign trade. Despite the evident advantages of pos-
sessing huge amounts of natural recourses there are problems with the structure of the 
Russian economy as it has struggled to raise its economy from the post-Soviet Union 
slump and at the same time it reminds of other resource-based economies (such as the 
                                                 
51 Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 9 March 2007, Official Docu-
ment,   
52 Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 9 March 2007 
53 Spruds.A, “The EU CFSP Towards Russia: The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement as a Test 
Case”, (2006), Riga, p. 78  
54 European Commission , “Energy for a Changing World: An Energy Policy for Europe, the need for 
action”, Directorate-General for Energy and Transport, Brussels (2007) 
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most African, Latin American countries) which have been unable to turn their natural 
resources into sustainable economic growth56. To illustrate the point of Russia’s eco-
nomic dependency on the energy sector it can be shown that the energy industry ac-
counts for almost one-third of industrial production and makes up more than 50% of 
export revenues. 57 Another reason for the low level of economic performance which 
can be found generally in resource-based economies can be attributed to the fact that 
in many of these countries the natural resource field has been largely dominated by 
state-owned or state-controlled enterprises which are evidently not as efficient com-
pared to private owned enterprises.58 This observation is true if applied to Russia as 
in 2004-2005 the state has tightened its grip on the key strategic sectors, especially 
natural resources (especially gas and electricity).  
       However, according to the energy analysts the nationalization of the world’s oil 
and gas reserves has been a dominant theme, where nationally-owned oil companies 
now control over 90% of the world’s proven oil reserves.59 In addition, the Russian 
energy sector is facing serious technical problems: the energy infrastructure e.g. the 
pipelines are in severe condition. Another problem is the pricing strategies that were 
inappropriate due to being largely subsidized in Soviet times, the strategy that which 
resulted in the distortion of the structure of demand. Besides, an important factor is 
also that even in the years when Russia has high energy revenues as currently, they 
are not being re-invested in the gas or oil industry.60  
       To add to the problems in the energy sector there is a strong domestic political 
resistance to foreign involvement in oil and gas which impedes the investment and 
technology transfer that is greatly needed in the energy sector in order to rehabilitate 
the damaged wells and introduce advanced techniques to extract oil and gas from dif-
ficult terrain. All these factors mentioned above indicate that although Russia has a 
great amount of potential as an energy supplier there are significant obstacles remain-
ing before Russia can realize its full potential.61 
       The dynamics of the three main fields in the energy sector in Russia which are 
oil, gas and electricity will each be presented bellow in order to give a clear picture of 
the developments and significance of each field. 
 
 
3.4.1 Oil 
 
Russia possesses 5% of proven world oil reserves and in the year 2002 produced 11% 
of the world’s crude oil thus becoming the second producer of crude oil in the world. 
                                                 
56 Op.cit. Ahrend.R,(2005), pp.1-3 
57 Christian von Hirschhausen in Gavrilenkov et al. (eds), Economic Opening Up and Growth in Rus-
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58 Op.cit Ahrend.R (2005), p.2 
59  Helm D. Russia’s Energy Policy: Politics or Economics? (2006), p.3.   
60 Op.cit, Johnson,D. (2005), pp. 182-183 
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The revenues from oil exports exceeded $ 13 bn in 2000 and continued to increase.62 
However, there are significant problems with the Russian oil industry. The absence of 
the greatly needed resources and investment has brought ageing equipment, poorly 
developed fields and limited transport infrastructure. According to the Russian Minis-
try of Energy 5% of crude oil output is lost through various leakages. Other specialist 
organizations put the figure at 7%. This means that huge amounts of Russian oil are 
lost due to the inefficiency of infrastructure in this field.63 Therefore investment of 
technology in the oil industry is crucial but the position of the government and large 
oil companies has been to optimize returns while world prices are at a high and not 
paying the needed attention to the long-term investment needs of the oil field.64 Con-
cerning the oil reserves at the end of 2005 production and consumption rates Russian 
crude oil reserves had a length of an estimated 21.4 years.65   
 
 
3.4.2 Gas 
 
The gas industry is an important strategic element by far exceeding that of oil. It 
represents the strategic aspect in Russia’s strategy for economic development and in-
ternational integration. Russia has the world’s largest gas reserves concentrated 
mainly in Western Siberia and estimated at comprising around one-third (32%) of the 
worlds proven reserves ahead of Iran (16) and Qatar (8%).66 Despite the huge 
amounts of gas reserves observers stress that there is a question mark about future 
levels of production from new fields due to the low investment. The most important 
gas company in Russia is Gazprom which is state owned and has over 300,000 em-
ployees making it the largest single business employer in Russia as well as the 
world’s largest gas company.  The shares of Gazprom in the global and Russian gas 
stocks makes up 17% and 60% respectively and provides about 20% and 90% of the 
global and Russian gas production.67  
       Generally, due to its size and importance Gazprom plays a crucial and dominant 
role in Russian domestic and foreign economics and politics. The analytics stress the 
dominant position of the near monopoly of Gazprom along with the restrictions on 
foreign investment in it have contributed to the slowing down of the development of 
the gas industry.68 In the last decade when there were proposals to demonopolize the 
Russian gas industry did not result in concrete measures as higher priority was given 
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to extracting immediate dividends from Gazprom’s existing export contracts with 
mainly European markets. Currently there are no plans in the Russian government to 
carry out reforms of Gazprom which would let the company become privatized.69 
 
 
3.4.3 Electricity 
 
Russia’s electricity supply industry is mainly dominated by the enterprise RAO Uni-
fied Energy Systems (UES) which is state owned. Since 1999 the negative trend of 
Russia’s electricity generation and consumption has been reversed. The electricity 
industry is still owed large amounts in payments as well as lack of fuel supplies at 
power stations which has led to periodic blackouts especially in the Russian Far East. 
In 2003 there were new laws initiated and passed that are aimed at the eventual trans-
formation of the electricity industry by e.g. separating UES’s generation and distribu-
tion arms where the distribution will be divided into smaller units before privatiza-
tion. However, the transmission grid will be continued to be owned by the state.70 In 
the next part the main features of the Russian Energy Strategy for the years 2003-
2020 will be presented as to give an understanding of the Russian position and its 
long term strategies and goals concerning the energy sector. 
 
 
3.4.4 Russia’s Energy Strategy 2003-2020 
 
The national energy policy that was formulated in Russia’s Energy Strategy to 2020 
regards improving energy efficiency as a top priority for the entire national economic 
policy.  The Energy Strategy stresses that in the coming years the export of energy 
resources will remain a key factor for the development of the national economy as 
well as for the strengthening of the economic and political position of Russia in the 
world community. 
       The main priorities of the Energy Strategy are secure supplies of energy for Rus-
sian household needs as well as the industrial sector by offering affordable and at the 
same time stimulating energy saving prices; risk management of crisis situations in 
the energy security; usage of energy saving technologies and equipment; reduction of 
the loss in the processes of extraction, processing, transportation and realization of 
energy production.         
       Significant attention is paid to the initiatives to decrease polluting risks that en-
ergy related processes are causing to the environment. In this respect the Energy 
Strategy calls for the minimizing of such harmful effects on the environment.71 
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The means to reach the set goals is seen through the creation of a civilized energy 
market that can be regulated/characterized by non-discriminatory economic interrela-
tions between market private actors and the state government. At the same time the 
Energy Strategy stresses that the functions of the government are limited to the crea-
tion of market infrastructure and legal framework including fiscal, customs, antimo-
nopoly regulation and tariff regulations.     
       The Energy Strategy also defines the objectives of the Russian foreign energy 
policy which stresses the importance of Russia’s integration into the global energy 
resource system; cooperation with foreign investors in the field of development of the 
energy resources and enhancing the efficiency of their utilization and acquiring new 
energy markets. In addition, the Russian energy foreign policy is aimed at changing 
the role of Russia from predominantly being a supplier of raw energy resources to an 
independent member of the world energy market which pursues its own autonomous 
energy policy on global energy markets.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
27 
 
 
 4 Legal Framework of the EU-Russia Re-lations in the Energy Field 
 
 
 
 
 
As it was outlined in the introductory chapter this section aims to present and discuss 
the legal framework of the EU-Russia energy partnership and to answer sub questions 
of this paper: What is the role of the ED? 
      With the important international changes in energy sector in 1999, with the de-
velopment of European internal energy market and enlargement process the economic 
interdependence of Russia and the EU has increased, where the energy-related issues 
were given the highest priority. The EU External Relation Commissioner Chris Patten 
and Pascal Lamu have suggested using the EU-Russia energy dialogue as 'a blueprint 
for wider relations.'  
  
 
4.1 Energy Strategies of the EU and Russia Towards 
Each Other 
 
As it was discussed before, the EU dependence on Russian gas is growing and in the 
light of the gas struggles between Russia and Ukraine and later Belorussia over gas 
prices, the EU responses to such events have indicated the crucial importance of the 
security of supplies for overall energy security.72 As a result of such events the EU is 
trying to enhance its relations in the energy field with Russia through intensive bilat-
eral energy dialogue and the multilateral cooperation in energy (ECT). It is possible 
to single out three most important drivers of the EU's energy strategy towards Russia: 
security, environment and liberalization. As a result of declining energy production 
and continued increases in demand the long-term security of energy supplies is a ma-
jor concern for the EU that has become a significant component of its overall Russian 
policy. Larsson in his analytical research on Russia’s reliability as energy supplier 
points that even though Russia is a reliable supplier (as most of its energy exports 
have reached its destinations and the risk for supply interruptions for European coun-
tries is presently very low), the risk to be affected by interruptions aimed at other 
non-EU countries (as a result of the political and economic tensions) is high. Accord-
ing to his observation out of the 55 cut-offs by Russia since 1991 only 11 had no po-
litical underpinnings that underline the usage of energy lever tools in the Russian for-
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eign energy policy. 73 In this connection, the EU is urgently looking for new possibili-
ties to diversify its energy supplies. As possible solutions the experts mention the fol-
lowing: increased supplies from Algeria, and the possibility to import Iranian gas to 
Europe via Azerbaijan and/or Armenia via Georgia to Turkey.74 
       The environment and liberalization factors are as well very important issues in 
their contribution to the security agenda. The experts suggest that greater energy effi-
ciency in Russia will release more supplies for export to Europe and European energy 
savings will reduce the need for Russian imports. As for liberalization of the Russian 
markets, Johnson argues that it will “utilize market signals to stimulate domestic en-
ergy savings and release recourses to modernize the industry and make it more effi-
cient which in turn should enhance Europe’s energy security.”75 
       As it is stressed by the experts it is important to agree on a set of realistic and 
mutually beneficial commitments with Russia that will facilitate EU-Russia energy 
cooperation and to identify concrete steps to rapidly improve the investment climate. 
Since the fundamental task of Russia’s energy strategy is to ensure national security, 
it continuously tries to utilize its energy policy to prevent geopolitical and macroeco-
nomic threats and risks of being blackmailed (four known cases are blackmailing by 
transit countries Ukraine, Moldova, Belorussia; producer countries such as Turk-
menistan and consumer country Turkey).76 Larsson stresses that at the same time 
Russia strives to be a reliable supplier in the eyes of the EU and it shows willingness 
to play by the international rules but if national security requires, it puts limit on the 
extent of which it can give up it independence.77 
       In connection to the relations with the EU Russia’s most important energy policy 
driver is the security of the demand or security of the consumer markets. The Russian 
government realizes the importance of having an image of a reliable supplier (and 
being it). This motivates Russia to construct new pipeline routes which bypass the 
transit countries and deliver energy products directly to the EU countries.78 The major 
planned projects are Nord Stream (the northern trans-European gas pipeline) and 
Burgas-Alexandroupolis pipeline (transporting Russian and Caspian oil to Bulgaria 
and further to Greece). 
       In spite of the growing attempts to diversify Russian economy in order to find 
alternative ways for the economy to grow and ideas of diversification of the con-
sumer markets (with recent increased interest in China as possible energy market) in 
the foreseeable future Europe and to a large extent the EU will remain the only con-
sumer of the Russian energy since the above mentioned diversification will require 
time and substantial financial investments. Another important issue of the energy pol-
icy is the attraction of investment to increase its oil and gas exports, to rehabilitate 
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and upgrade its energy infrastructure and to use knowledge and technology transfers 
as a means of enhancing economic growth.  
 
 
4.2 What is the Role of the ED?  
 
As it was underlined previously, in energy field more than in any other area the EU 
and Russia have mutual interests. For the EU-25, Russia is the main supplier of the 
hydrocarbons: 25% of its gas(50% of its imports) and 25% of its oil(over 30% of all 
its imports) comes from Russia.79 Some 63% (130 billion cubic meters (bcm)) of 
Russia’s natural gas exports of 205 bcm were delivered to European countries in the 
year 2000, with contractual requirements to increase deliveries to around 200 bcm by 
the year 2008.80  Dependence on Russian sag is considerable within the EU: Finland’s 
shares are 99%, France- 24%, Germany- 39%, Greece -76%, Italy- 34%.81 Energy 
dependence is especially high the in the new EU’s MS. Apart from Slovenia, the 
shares are 70-100% for natural gas and oil: Poland imports 87%, Slovakia 86%, the 
Czech republic 80%, Hungary 76%, Lithuania 71%, Estonia 100%, Latvia, 57%.82 
       As for Russia, the importance of the EU as a main energy consumer market can-
not be underestimated. Since the EU- 25 is the final destination for more than half of 
Russian oil and gas and taking into consideration the revenues that the Russian gov-
ernment gets from the energy trade with the EU (oil and gas exports for  74.0 USD 
billion, accounting for 20-25 % share of GDP growth)83 the EU market is of vital im-
portance for Russia. Besides, Russian energy sector badly needs investment and ex-
pertise. The scale of investment required in Russia’s energy sector is considerable. 
According to Russia’s Energy Strategy 2001 - 2020, need for new capital in the sec-
tor has been estimated at between €560 and €650 billion over the period to 2020.84 
       To summarize these statistical data it is possible to say that the EU and Russia 
are energy interdependent in different ways: the EU needs to import increasing quan-
tities of energy, and Russia needs markets for its natural resources and the European 
capital to modernize and expand its energy sector.85 
       In acknowledgement of the importance of interdependence, the two sides 
launched a bilateral Energy Dialogue at the EU-Russia Summit in Paris in 2000. The 
ED is aimed at providing a wide and stable partnership between the EU and Russia 
and to enhance the reliability of energy supplies both in the EU and Russia. The Joint 
Declaration of the Summit recognized the mutual dependence and agrees: 
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                  “to institute, on a regular basis, an Energy Dialogue which will enable 
progress to be made in the definition of an EU-Russia energy partnership and ar-
rangements for it. This will provide an opportunity to rise all the questions of com-
mon interest relating to the sector, including of cooperation on energy saving, ration-
alization of production and transport infrastructures, European investment possibili-
ties, and relations between produces and consumer countries. The planned ratification 
of the Energy Charter Treaty by Russia and the improvement of the investment cli-
mate will be important aspects in this context.”86 
       The main objective of the energy partnership is “to enhance the energy security 
of the European continent by binding Russia and the EU into a closer relationship in 
which all issues of mutual concern in the energy sector can be addressed while, at the 
same time, ensuring that the policies of opening and integrating energy markets are 
pursued.”87 
Against this background, the EU-Russia ED has identified a number of common and 
complementary interests for which concrete actions for the short and medium-term 
will be implemented. These areas include:88 ensuring reliable energy supplies in the 
short and long-term future, increasing energy efficiency, securing long term invest-
ment, opening up energy markets, diversifying the range of imports and exports of 
energy products, enhancing the technological base of the energy sector of the econ-
omy, improvement of the legal basis for energy production and transport in Russia, 
ensuring the physical security of transport networks. 
       Apart from the above mentioned issues the ED also has an environmental aspect 
as it aims to reduce the impact that Russia’s energy infrastructure causes on the envi-
ronment. 
The ED is managed through the institutions set up by the Partnership and Coopera-
tion Agreement (PCA) where the European Commissioner for Energy Andris Pie-
balgs leads the Dialogue on the EU side and Industry and Energy Minister Viktor 
Khristenko is his Russian counterpart. Different support structures such as the Tech-
nology Center and subcommittees have been recently created to maintain the work of 
the ED.89 
 
 
4.2.1 Results of the ED: Joint Progress Reports 2000-2006 
 
As it is stated in the progress report of the EU Commission since its launch in 2000 
the overall progress in the ED has been substantial with positive results in different 
directions of the energy cooperation. The ED has provided a framework for the reso-
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lution of a number of potential energy problems between the two sides and has made 
a significant contribution to strengthening the security of energy supply to the EU.90 
       There is a number of the specific issues being addressed during the whole period 
the ED development:91 Alleged limitation of 30% on imports of hydrocarbons, clean 
coal projects, electricity interconnections, energy savings and energy efficiency, long 
term contracts for natural gas, networks - rehabilitation of the existing Russian hy-
drocarbon export network, non-commercial risk guarantee mechanism, nuclear safe-
guards, Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) and trade in nuclear materials. 
The thematic groups of experts on investment, infrastructure, energy efficiency and 
trade flows that were set up for the evaluation of the ED progress, have made in-
depth examination of major issues of common interest and identified the successful 
areas of the ED implementation. 
 
 
4.2.2 The ED as an Instrument of the Single Market 
 
According to the evaluation of these expert groups the ED opened the way to Euro-
pean investment in the Russian energy market and provided a forum for tackling dif-
ficulties faced by Russian companies when trying to enter the single market. In this 
connection, companies such as BP, Shell, and ENI have made significant investments 
as well as Russian investments in the EU have forthcoming essentially through stakes 
which Gasprom has bought.92Another issue that has been improved in the course of 
the ED is the territoriality clauses in supply contracts (though not to all clauses are 
deleted, e.g. with Austria and Germany) and restrictions on the import of gas and pet-
rol. This included the preservation of long-term contracts for the supply of gas, an 
important factor in the security of supply, and the deletion of measures that went 
against EU competition rules.93 
 
 
4.2.3 A Less Polluting Transport System 
 
 The essential improvements were reached in the field of the physical security of the 
transport of energy supplies which were aimed to address pollution risks. As a result, 
Russia has increased its controls on oil tankers and backed efforts by the EU to get 
international backing for similar measures through the International Maritime Or-
ganization. The experts of the ED have studied the feasibility of regional surveillance 
system by satellite to prevent accidents and detect leaks in oil and gas infrastructure. 
In this respect the ED has helped to revive the negotiations regarding linking of Gali-
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leo and Glonass94systems (started in 1999) which can strengthen the security of 
transport infrastructure and are expected to be adopted in 2007.95 
 
 
4.2.4 Trade in Energy Products 
 
Trade in hydrocarbons has been one of the primary subjects of clarification in the ED. 
The alleged restrictions on the energy imports according to which the Member States 
have to decrease their energy imports from one energy supplier to 30%  has proved to 
be an issue that could have restricted further cooperation in the field of energy. As the 
President of Russia Vladimir Putin has stated: “…if Europe treats us as an equal part-
ner, then in regard to Russia the rules will not be operative, by which an EU country 
cannot receive more than 30% of energy resources from a country which is not a 
member of this community. Today such rules are in force, and they really can lead to 
a restriction of our cooperation. And in Europe and in Germany they will inevitably 
lead to an increase in prices, including - for domestic users.”96 However, following 
the discussions between the EU and its Russian counterparts the EU negotiators reas-
sured that there were no longer restrictions on imports of gas and oil into the EU. 
       Trade relations in the area of nuclear material between Russia and the new Mem-
ber States represent more that 200 USD million per year to Russia, and correspond to 
80% of the market in the new MS (or 12% of the market in the EU 25). In this con-
nection through intensive negotiations within the ED’s expert committees the parties 
have defined rules and principles which would apply in this area and by this made 
possible to confirm the validity of the contracts (long term contracts between the 
Russian export companies and the new Member States went well in 2004) in accor-
dance with Euratom Treaty.97 
 
 
4.2.5 Energy Efficiency Programmes 
 
Increasing energy efficiency is one of the priorities of the Russian's energy Strategy. 
In this area industrial cooperation between Russia and the EU through the exchange 
of expertise and technology has given positive results. In this respect joint pilot pro-
jects on energy efficiency has been started in Russian regions: Archangelsk, Astra-
khan and Kaliningrad. The project in Kaliningrad is of a special importance in regard 
of energy efficiency due to the city’s position as a Russian enclave within the terri-
tory of the EU. In Kaliningrad, estimations of energy savings as a result of an energy 
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efficiency programme are in the order of 35%-40%. This potential is significant con-
sidering that 90% of the Enclave’s primary energy comes from Russia.98 
Another issue that can be attributed to the success of the ED is the ratification of the 
Kyoto protocol by Russian State Duma in October 2004. The EU funded TACIS pro-
gramme provided technical assistance in the implementation of the energy related 
issues of the Kyoto protocol. 
 
 
4.2.6 Transeuropean Energy Networks 
 
The reliability of energy transport is one of the preconditions for a stable and con-
tinuous energy supply in the EU. Hydrocarbons coming from Russia pass either by 
land route /oil and gas pipeline) or by sea route that is why the transport networks 
was an essential objective of the ED. The Trans-European energy networks frame-
work has identified the guidelines for a number of electricity and gas infrastructure 
projects that were adopted in June 2003. These guidelines have designated as ‘a prior-
ity axis’ the gas pipeline project connecting the United Kingdom and continental 
northern Europe with Russia.99 
Having discussed the role of the ED and its achievements in the enhancing the coop-
eration in energy field between the EU and Russia is possible to conclude that the 
dialogue has demonstrated its usefulness through concrete results where the policies 
and strategies of both parties can lead to even closer cooperation. Nevertheless, there 
is a number of conflictual issues and questions within the ED that reflect the incom-
patibility in the  EU's and Russia's positions on how to proceed with the energy coop-
eration and which need to be resolved to enable a better integration. In this respect the 
conflictual issues of the ED will be discussed in the next section of this paper. 
 
 
4.3 Conflictual Issues of the ED 
 
This section will discuss the existing conflictual issues within the ED between the EU 
and Russia i.e. answering the sub-question of this paper which is formulated as fol-
lows: What are the conflictual issues of the ED? 
 
 
4.3.1 Territoriality Clauses  
 
The EU has been firmly dedicated to liberalizing its energy markets both for indus-
trial users as well as for households. However, the conflictual issue lies in the fact to 
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the fact that Russia gas supplies the EU countries are delivered under long-term con-
tracts some of which contain the controversial so-called territorial clauses. According 
to theses clauses in the case when a MS receives more gas that it needs it is not al-
lowed to sell it on to its neighbors. As the European side insists, such clauses are 
against the EU single-market rules and prevent the EU from developing a functioning 
EU gas market as the clauses allow Gazprom to sell gas to various MS at different 
prices.100 
       Although long term gas contracts have been having an important role in the de-
velopment of the European gas market in e.g. providing a risk sharing arrangement 
between the producer and buyer and play a crucial role in the energy security of the 
EU, nevertheless the EU stresses that these contracts must proceed with the disap-
pearance of restrictions within the EU. The consequence of EU’s firm stand on this 
issue has been the reaching of a settlement with the Italian oil and gas company ENI 
and Gazprom concerning a number of restrictive clauses which exist in their con-
tracts. There were other investigations of contracts initiated which were breach of EU 
single-market rules in Austria and Germany and the Commission is confidant that it 
will reach an agreement that will lead to the deletion of the remaining clauses. 101 
 
 
4.3.2 Electricity Grid 
 
At the EU-Russia Summit of 2001 both sides recognized the interconnection of the 
Russian and continental EU electricity grids as one of the projects of ‘common inter-
est’. They consider that full integration of the electricity markets will lead to signifi-
cant benefits in the development of a free competition, improvement of security of 
electricity supply and the creation of new possibilities for business cooperation in the 
electricity sectors of both EU and Russia.102  
       However, there have been conflictual positions regarding the process of realiza-
tion of the above mentioned initiatives. Russia is strongly pursuing an effort to link 
its own electricity grid to that of the EU. As Katinka Barysch points out this would 
enable Unified Energy Systems (UES) the electricity monopoly of Russia, not only to 
sell surplus electricity to the EU consumers but also to make up for temporary short-
ages in its own market by importing power from the EU.  
       The EU’s position in this matter is that Russia must adopt the standards of the 
EU for competition, nuclear safety and environmental protection as well as the end of 
subsidies that Gazprom offers to UES in the form of cheap gas. According to the EU 
Russia does not fulfil these requirements. It has been a difficult task of finding an 
agreement on these issues and therefore the two parties have established an expert 
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panel with the task of determining the extent to which Russian and the EU rules and 
policies diverge in these areas. 103 
 
 
4.3.3 Dual Gas Pricing vs. Unified 
 
Russia has a dual gas pricing policy in which low revenues from domestic gas prices 
are subsidized by much higher European- and to a lesser extent Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS)-gas prices.104 
According to this policy Russian federal authorities have substantial legal power over 
the natural gas sector at its disposal to improve the social and economic environment. 
The main reason for dual pricing has been to provide a natural gas subsidy to the 
Russian economy including for household needs and large industry enterprises. 
Within this system, three main clauses can be identified: domestic sales are priced 
very low, sales to countries of CIS are priced higher; and sales to Europe are priced 
the highest. In 2003, 65% of Gazprom’s revenues were from European sales, and 
European prices were six times those of domestic consumers.105 These are the cir-
cumstances in which the conflictual issue between the EU and Russia occur. 
       Such policy of dual gas pricing has led the European side to take a tough position 
and to argue that low prices on the home market act as a trade barrier by providing 
unfair advantages to Russian energy intensive companies over their European coun-
terparts. Such energy prices are therefore illegitimate. In order to eliminate such un-
fair advantages the gas prices must be unified. As the European experts underline the 
pricing at European level does not mean that Russian domestic users should pay the 
same as Europeans for their gas. Instead unified pricing refers to equalizing Russian 
domestic prices to European export netback prices- that is export prices adjusted for 
transport costs, taxes, and import duties. 
       As for Russian counterparts, they argue that by declaring the low home prices 
illegitimate, the EU tries “to deprive the Russia of its rights to avail itself of its natu-
ral competitive advantage.”106 As Ruslan Grinberg stresses that while demanding to 
decrease the price gap the EU partners do not consider the peculiarities of the struc-
ture of Russian economy known for its extremely high energy consumption, severe 
natural conditions, the difficulty of access to oil and gas fields and extraordinary high 
share of transportation in the total production costs. He further points out that the uni-
fication of the prices in an abrupt manner would inevitably result in an economic col-
lapse and deep social crises.107 The social problems will rise as the energy intensive 
companies are confronted with higher costs. Thus, this situation can lead to rising un-
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employment and the possibility of bankruptcy of a number of energy intensive com-
panies.108 For Russian government these problems pose serious risks that signifi-
cantly diminish the incentives towards unified prices.  
       Nevertheless, according to estimations of the experts, the unified gas prices can 
be beneficial for Russian government through revenues gained from dividend and tax 
payments. In this connection, as Spanier observes the Russian government is showing 
the signs of will to change the policies in connection to domestic prices. The Energy 
Strategy of Russia for up to 2020 has doubled the prices in 2006 and plans to triple 
them by 2010, but still the government insists that the increase should not be that 
large as to increase the price up to the netback European export level.109 
 
 
4.3.4 Production Sharing Agreements  
 
As Barysch observes the dialogue on oil is not politically charged to the same degree 
as the gas industry due to its being already to a high degree privatized and liberalized. 
However, the important issue in this matter is the process of attracting EU investors 
to the Russian oil sector. In this respect the PSAs play a fundamental role in the at-
traction of foreign capital and investment.110 To specify further, PSAs are taking 
place between the state which is the owner of mineral resources and a foreign oil 
company (FOC) as a contractor that provides technical and financial services for ex-
ploration and development operations. The state is usually represented by the gov-
ernment or one of its agencies such as the national oil company (NOC). PSAs are 
mainly used to establish the share that the private company will obtain of the natural 
resources (oil extraction) extracted from the country where the investment takes 
place. Besides, the entity that invests in a development project is the first to capture 
the investment from revenues generated by the forthcoming output.111 
       However, as Kirsten Bindemann underlines the state remains the owner of the 
energy sources only to the contractor’s entitlement to its share of production. The 
government or its NOC usually has the option to participate in different aspects of the 
exploration and development process.  112 
       The PSAs became part of the legislation in Russia in 1998 and must in some spe-
cific cases be approved by the government. However, the Russian authorities have 
decided in the 2003 to keep only a limited number of PSAs because they consider 
that the undertaken current reforms contribute to an attractive investment climate un-
der more standard forms of investment. The Russian government bases such approach 
on the BP’s decision to commit more than $6bn to its Russian ventures and other gi-
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ant offshore operations financed mainly by Royal Dutch/Shell and ExxonMobil.113In 
addition, this approach has led to a more difficult procedure to conclude new PSAs. 
Due to these actions, PSAs would in the future only be suitable for projects which 
failed to attract investors.114  
       The EU stresses the need for Russia to establish a workable framework fore 
PSAs as they are the principal way for foreign firms to invest in Russia and for the 
Russian government to maintain a degree of control over valuable resources. The EU 
points out that besides the mentioned investment projects there has been remarkably 
little foreign investment in the Russian energy sector. The reason for such low foreign 
investment is considered to be the absence of a functioning PSAs, uncertain property 
rights and prevalent public rejection in Russia to selling its national recourses to for-
eign investors.115 The EU position on this matter is that it considers PSAs to continue 
being a necessary legal framework for projects in environmentally challenging areas 
that are capital intensive.116 
        The above mentioned conflictual issues between the EU and Russia pose signifi-
cant difficulties for the further development of the EU-Russia energy partnership. As 
it is possible to notice these conflictual issues are different in nature, some of them 
identify the divergence of EU and Russian positions in terms of technical standards, 
different positions on how to regulate foreign investment into Russia, different vi-
sions on energy pricing as well as the importance of long term contracts within the 
energy sector.  
As it was underlined in the beginning of the paper the next section will highlight the 
conflictual issues of the ECT which is an important aspect of the EU-Russia energy 
relations and the examination of which is crucial for the understanding of the con-
flictual issues in general.  
 
 
4.4 The Energy Charter Treaty 
 
In 1990 the European Community (EC) initiated the cooperation in energy field with 
the Eastern European countries. Such political initiative has found its realization in 
the creation of the Energy Charter Treaty. The idea of the creation of such a treaty 
was dictated by the mutual realization that in the conditions of growing interdepend-
ence between the consuming, producing and transit countries, international coopera-
tion can be more effectively regulated by multilateral rules than by bilateral agree-
ments alone. In this connection the role of the ECT was seen as to build a legal foun-
dation for energy security based on principles of open competitive market and sus-
tainable development.  
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       The objectives of the ECT are to provide countries with natural recourses means 
to attract investment, protect their interests and to guarantee reliable transportation for 
their energy exports to their consumers. For the energy importing countries the ECT 
provides protection of their investments and mechanisms to promote the security of 
supply.  
A core principle of the Treaty (ECT Article 18) is national sovereignty over energy 
resources where each member country is free to decide whether and how its national 
energy resources are developed. Besides the government also decides the extent to 
which its energy sector is open to foreign investors.117 
       The European Energy Charter was adopted in 1991 and was followed by the le-
gally binding ECT signed in 1994 and which entered into force in 1998. Since its 
creation fifty one states have signed the Treaty plus the EU which signed it collec-
tively as well in the name of the European Communities and therefore the total num-
ber of the signatories is fifty two. However, out of the fifty two, five states have still 
not ratified the Treaty. Russia is one of the states that has not ratified the Treaty but 
has agreed to apply the provisions to the extent that it is consistent with Russia’s own 
constitution, laws and regulations.118 Such provisional application is provided by Ar-
ticle 45(1) which states that “Each signatory agrees to apply this Treaty provisionally 
pending its entry into force … to the extent that such provisional application is not 
inconsistent with its constitution, laws or regulation.”119 
 
 
4.5 Conflictual issues of the ECT 
 
The underlying reasons for Russia’s non ratification of the ECT lie in the provisions 
of the so called Transit Protocol (TP) of the ECT which reflect the incompatibility of 
the EU’s and Russia’s positions on the freedom of transit.  
       The TP of the ECT obliges the participating states to take the necessary measures 
to facilitate transit of energy, consistent with the principle of freedom of transit, and 
to secure established energy flows. The transit countries are also under an obligation 
not to interrupt or reduce existing transit flows, even if they have disputes with an-
other country concerning this transit.120 Such provisions of the Protocol are aimed at 
diminishing risks and costs related to transit; increasing competitiveness of transit 
supplies and improving energy security which includes security of supplies, security 
of demand and security of infrastructure.121 
       Since for Russia the issue of transit of energy recourses is more important than 
for any other country where the proportion of transit of gas across third countries 
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amounts to 95% if compared with e.g. Netherlands 24%, Norway 32%, Algeria 55% 
the fair TP provisions are of high importance.122 
       In the present formulation of the TP provisions Russia finds several aspects that 
do not take into account Russia’s strategic interests as the major transit country 
within the ECT. The main arguments against ratifying the ECT are given by Russia 
as following: First, the ratification would undercut Gazprom’s position on European 
markets by forcing Russia to open up its network for cheaper gas from Central Asia, 
second, ratification would require that Central Asia states be given accesses to the 
Russia pipeline system at subsidized internal tariff levels, third, ratification would 
place in jeopardy the system of long-term contracts for supplies of Russian gas to 
Europe.123  
In addition, Russia stresses that it regards as unfair the Article 20 of the TP on Re-
gional Economic Integration Organization (initiated by the EU Commission) which 
states that on the territory of the EU the provisions of the TP are not applicable since 
the transit of the energy recourses on the territory of the EU is regulated by the EU 
internal market mechanism. This can mean that e.g. the tariffs for transit of Asian gas 
will be lower that that of Russian gas to Europe.  
       Vladimir Milov emphasizes such a provision (Article 20) points at the double 
standard approach that is present in the construction of the energy Transit in relation 
to Russian interests.124 The disagreements and the difficulty to find consolidated posi-
tion has resulted in Russia’s passiveness in negotiations and at times Russia even 
failed to attend them without explaining the reasons. As Konoplyanik stresses, such 
refusal to participate in substantive discussions in the framework of negotiations and 
consultations “...is the worst possible strategy of all...which subscribes to a different 
tactic ‘counter-acting through inaction’”.125 
       As for the European side, it advocates the development of energy framework of 
the TP in line with the so called British model which is based on a competitive and 
liberalized market with open accesses to pipelines and networks (which at the same 
time rejects long-term contracts in favor of spot deals). In this connection the EU in-
sists on the ratification if the ECT by Russia in order to get free access to Gazprom’s 
pipelines and networks, which will lead to the break up of Gazprom’s monopoly and 
the state’s firm grip on the pipelines, and which will further enhance European secu-
rity of energy supplies. The EU pressures Russia to let go its ‘strategic obsession’ in 
energy relations and to ratify the ECT if it wants to convince the Europe of its reli-
ability as energy supplier.126 Such European energy policy becomes especially impor-
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tant and understandable in light of the recent Ukrainian and Belorussian energy dis-
putes with Russia and subsequent disruptions in the delivery of energy resources.127  
       In spite of its non-ratification of the ECT Russia continuously reconfirms its 
commitment to the Energy Charter process as Russia “views the Energy Charter as an 
important instrument for international cooperation.”128 Russia stresses that it does not 
seek unilateral advantages but common benefits such as insuring the stability and se-
curity of energy supplies.  
Having examined the conflictual issues identified in EU-Russia energy relations it 
can be concluded that these issues present difficulties for further EU-Russia coopera-
tion and partnership in the energy field. 
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5 Analyzing Conflictual Issues 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Interdependence  
 
 
The final chapter of this paper presents the explanatory part and aims at answering 
the main question: why do conflictual issues in EU-Russia energy relations occur?  
       As it was suggested the analysis will be done with the help of the theory of inter-
dependence and the interpretative model of conflict emergence. The theory of inter-
dependence provides the explanation of how asymmetric interdependence can be-
come a source of power in a bargaining process and its role in the conflictual issues. 
       In the EU-Russia energy relations interdependence is clearly observable. This 
interdependence determines the incentives of both sides for cooperation and partner-
ship which aim at enhancing the energy security that is a vital aspect of any state’s 
well functioning. Having examined the empirical context of the EU-Russia energy 
interdependence it is possible to observe that this interdependence is asymmetric 
since it reflects the uneven distribution of the benefits and costs in EU-Russia energy 
context. In the course of the last years the EU perceives itself as more dependent on 
the supplies of Russian gas than Russia depends on the EU energy market. This un-
derstanding derives: first, from the fact that demand for energy consumption is in-
creasing, especially gas, where Russia is the main supplier to the EU; second, the 
relatively expensive production of alternative energy recourses; third, the possibility 
for diversification of suppliers is not an easy task for the EU since most of the alter-
native suppliers are located in politically hostile and unstable environments; fourth, 
the internal difficulties to liberalize the EU market where there is growing divergence 
in positions of the MS on how to enhance the security of energy supplies (they con-
sider the security of supplies as a crucial aspect of their national security agenda and 
therefore they are reluctant to let such issues be considered at the EU level). Taking 
into consideration the above mentioned factors it can be concluded that this is a kind 
of vulnerability interdependence which inflicts substantial costs for the EU and un-
derlines the difficulty to adjust the EU’s policies in the event of unfavorable changes 
within the Russian energy policy. 
       Concerning Russia’s dependency on the EU energy market it can be argued that 
it is dependant but to a lesser extent. The following factors can support this argument: 
first, Russia has bilateral long-term contracts with the EU MS which secures Russia’s 
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energy exports. Second, Russia is a major transit country which owns the important 
pipelines networks without which the Asian gas cannot be transported to the EU, Be-
sides, Russia is continuously strengthening its positions by signing to new pipeline 
projects with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.129 Third, possession of one third of the 
world’s proven gas reserves gives Russia a stable position of being a major gas sup-
plier, what in its turn, in the conditions of growing gas consumption in the world, 
suggests that Russia will continue to be one of the few viable suppliers of gas. 
On the other hand Russia is dependent on the EU energy market as a substantial part 
of Russia’s energy exports go to the EU at high prices which constitutes a large part 
of state revenues. This can be characterized as sensitivity interdependence where 
Russia has the ability to adjust its policies as a response to the changes in the EU’s 
energy policy. This conclusion derives from the fact that even if the EU limits its im-
ports from Russia, the non-EU states (Former Soviet Republics) which are dependent 
on Russian energy to a high degree will continue to be a viable market for Russian 
energy products. One more opportunity to compensate for the loss in case of EU lim-
ited imports of Russian energy is the gradual increase in the domestic price levels 
which already takes place. 
       According to the theory of interdependence such asymmetries can provide a 
source of power to a less dependent actor in a bargaining process and put it in a more 
favorable position in the negations where it can manipulate the bargaining outcomes. 
In the context of EU-Russia interdependence, there are sufficient grounds to consider 
Russia a less dependent side which provides it with a powerful source in the bargain-
ing process over disputable issues in energy relations which have been examined pre-
viously. 
       In several issues it gives Russia the ability to withdrawal from the negotiations 
without any particular loss as a result of its non participation (as it is the case of con-
flictual issues of the ECT). Concerning the PSAs Russia itself decides how the proc-
ess of investment is carried out i.e. it uses its favorable position of being the owner of 
the natural recourses who makes the decisions without particular consideration of the 
EU’s interests on these issues. In the territoriality clauses and dual gas pricing issues 
this asymmetric interdependence gives Russia further incentive to continue to pursue 
its own policies.   
       This situation contributes to further intensification and deepening of the conflict-
ual discourse and makes it difficult to manage such conflictual issues. In addition, 
some of the achievements in the EU-Russia energy relations as well can be attributed 
to the manipulation of the asymmetric interdependence by Russia i.e. Russia secured 
long-term contracts as the basis for energy cooperation and the clarification of the 
question on the alleged restriction on imports in favor of Russia.  
 
                                                 
129 Recent agreement reached between Russia, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan on 12th of May 2007. 
Official site of the Ministry of Industry and Energy of the Russian Federation, Translated from Russian 
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5.2 Interpretative Model of Conflict Emergence   
 
The innovative theory of the understanding of conflict emergence provides a deeper 
explanation of the deployed logics behind the choice of foreign policies by different 
actors and argues that the clash of principles of state sovereignty and international 
integration is the main source of conflict. 
       The analysis of the context of the EU-Russia energy relations shows that out-
comes of such interaction can be characterized as both cooperative and conflictual. In 
order to understand the reasons for the emergence of conflict it seems to be appropri-
ate to analyze why in the first hand cooperation occurs.  
        If analyzed with the help of the interpretative model of conflict emergence the 
creation of the multi-lateral international regime of the ECT and the bilateral EU-
Russia ED is the results of the match of the logics behind the choice of the foreign 
policies of the respective actors. Both the EU and Russia realize the importance of 
integration in the field of energy as a necessary mechanism for the enhancement of 
energy security in the face of the emerging energy related global threats. In the case 
of the ED such realization is reflected in mutual deployment of the integrationalist 
logic by the EU and Russia which resulted in the creation of the ‘common space’ in 
the form of the ED and its institutional framework. The fact that such cooperation 
became possible and subsequently led to positive results and achievements such as: 
the improvement of transport systems (concerning the reduction of pollution); the 
clarification of questions concerning import limits and trade of nuclear materials; the 
creation of energy efficiency programmes; the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by 
Russia and the initiation of several projects for such as Transeuropean energy net-
works, reflects that both parties have defined rules and principles that are mutually 
beneficial. In the interpretation of Prozorov’s theory such integrative moves can be 
characterized as symmetric based on non hierarchical interaction (as none of the par-
ties insisted on its ‘rules of the game’).  
       In the case of the ECT the initiation by the European Commission of the multi-
lateral cooperation within the energy field was met by the equivalent response by 
Russia which resulted in the signing of the ECT by Russia. However, Russia decided 
to implement the ECT only provisionally in order to evaluate all possible outcomes of 
the ratification of such a Treaty and to what extent it is in line with its national regu-
lation. The further development in the ECT legal framework such as the creation of 
the TP has generated some conflictual issues in the EU-Russia energy relations. The 
examination of the conflictual issues connected to the TP through the interpretative 
model suggests that the mismatch between the deployed logics behind the opted for 
policies by Russia and the EU as a reason for the emergence of conflictual issues dis-
cussed in the empirical research. In this situation the integrationist logic of the EU is 
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met with dissent and rejection by Russia and as a result leads to Russia’s self-
exclusion from the ratification of the ECT. Firstly, the rejection by the Russian side 
can be explained by its perception that integration in the questions of freedom of tran-
sit is asymmetric, with features of hierarchical inclusion. The initiation by the EU of 
Article 20 and further inclusion of it into the TP puts the EU in a more favorable po-
sition than Russia in questions of transit tariffs. This means that the EU insists on its 
‘rules of the game’ and defines who is integrating (EU) and who is integrated (Rus-
sia).   
        Another reason for Russia’s self-exclusion is the fact that the energy resources 
play a crucial role for the enhancement of national security including the economic 
and social development of Russia. The empirical research presented earlier reflects 
this reality where Russia is considered to be a resource-based economy with the GDP 
to a large extent made up of revenues from the energy sector, and the fact that the di-
versification of the economy is in its initial phase. This leads to the argumentation by 
the Russian side that the provisions of the TP will jeopardize the long-term contracts, 
undermine Russia’s position as a major energy power and threaten its geopolitical 
interests. The response of the EU side to such argumentation as of not having any 
grounds for points to the difficulty of the two parties to treat each other as legiti-
mately different i.e. having their own interests and motivations that need not neces-
sarily coincide. In the terminology of the interpretative model, in this situation Russia 
perceives the integrative move of the EU as an ‘assault on sovereignty’ and attempts 
to avoid such ‘unwelcome intrusion’ into its legitimately bound space.  
       Having analyzed in detail the reasons for the emergence of conflictual issues 
within the ECT through the opposition of the deployed logics by EU and Russia I 
would like to analyze in general other identified conflictual issues in energy relations 
with the help of the interpretative model.  
       Concerning the territorial clause issue the Russian side deploys sovereign logic in 
its opted for policy since it prefers bilateral relations with the EU MS and as a result 
insists on long-term contracts as well as the prohibition for them to resell the sur-
pluses of the gas imported. This logic is met with rejection by the EU since it is in 
breach of the EU single market rules. As a result of the mismatch of these logics Rus-
sia prefers to negotiate on a bilateral basis with the MS and insists on its territoriality 
clauses since it argues that the rules of the single market do not apply to Russia and 
thus the EU’s claims cannot be a substantial ground for considering in this conflictual 
issue. 
       In the case of the electricity grid issue Russia deploys the integrationist logic be-
hind its policies with intentions to integrate the electricity grid of the EU and Russia. 
Such logic is met by EU with descent which leads to EU self-exclusion from planning 
common projects in this area. The reason for such a position of the EU is that it 
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agrees on integration only on its rules and conditions .i.e. Russia must adopt the stan-
dards of the EU for competition, safety and environmental protection.  
       In the conflictual issue over dual gas pricing the EU side deploys integrationist 
logic behind its choice of policies since it wants Russia to increase its domestic gas 
prices and unify them with European netback prices. Such logic is met with dissent 
and rejection from the Russian side. This mismatch of logics leads to Russia’s self-
exclusion from pursuing this unifying price policy. The rejection is due to the percep-
tion of integration in this field as being asymmetric i.e. the EU’s insistence on unified 
prices without considering the negative consequences of such policies for Russian 
societal situation.   
       The last of the conflictual issues identified in this paper concerns the PSA’s 
agreements. In this situation the integrationist logic deployed by the EU is met by 
Russian sovereign logic in this issue since Russia by all means tries to reject the par-
ticipation of foreign investors in its energy sector since Russia considers it a ‘unwel-
come intrusion’ into its sovereign space. Such a mismatch of logics leads to the ex-
clusion of the EU investors by Russia from the process of energy production and un-
derlines the difficulty of both sides to recognize as legitimate their respective interests 
concerning the regulations and conditions provided for investment. 
       This analysis of the EU-Russia conflictual issues of the ED and the ECT with the 
help of interpretative model gives grounds to suggest that the reason for conflict 
emergence is the mismatch of deployed logics which is caused by asymmetric condi-
tions of integration and the difficulty to recognize as legitimate each others ‘sover-
eign’ interests.  
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6 Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
The purpose of this study is to contribute to deeper understanding of the EU-Russia 
energy partnership. Due to the fact that energy relations are hotly debated in the EU 
and Russia and such discussion reflect the substantial differences in visions on how to 
proceed with cooperation, the aim of the study was to answer the question of why the 
conflictual issues occur in EU-Russia energy relations. My ambition was to approach 
this problematic aspect of EU-Russia relations as objectively as possible. Therefore, 
the innovative approach to the understanding of the reasons for conflict emergence 
was adopted in this paper. Having done the empirical research and analyzed it with 
the help of the interpretative model it is possible to summarize the main findings.  
       First, the identified cause of conflict emergence in the EU-Russia energy rela-
tions is the clash of logics deployed by the EU and Russia in their opted for foreign 
energy policies.  
       Second, this clash of logics is conditioned by either asymmetric integration 
which suggests hierarchical inclusion of the integrated party by the integrating or by 
the difficulty of both sides to recognize as legitimate their respective sovereign inter-
ests in the energy sector.  
       Third, it is possible to observe that both the EU and Russia have deployed both 
logics – integrationist and sovereign – in their energy strategies towards each other. 
Nevertheless, some generalizations about the preferences of Russia and the EU in 
their foreign energy policies can be identified. In this connection, it can be concluded 
that Russia’s dominant logic deployed behind chosen policies is sovereign. As for the 
EU, the deployed logic is predominantly integrationist (though quite asymmetric). 
Such difference in the predominance of particular logics in the opted for policies of 
the EU and Russia can be attributed to the fact that relations between the EU and 
Russian in the energy field are characterized as relations between consumer and pro-
ducer countries what in its turn means that they have different interests towards each 
other and therefore pursue different policies. 
      The last conclusion of the analysis is that asymmetric interdependence in the en-
ergy field intensifies the conflictual issues and presents an obstacle for further coop-
eration. According to the theory, interdependence should be the reason for coopera-
tion between the interdependent actors. However, the analysis of the kind of interde-
pendence that exists between the EU and Russia suggests that it is an asymmetric in-
terdependence where Russia has more grounds to consider itself less dependent 
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which gives it an additional source of power in the bargaining process over conflict-
ual energy issues.  
       Finally, I would like to present ideas about further research on this topic. I be-
lieve that it would be both interesting and challenging to explore how the cooperative 
outcomes can be reached in the management of the conflictual issues examined in 
this study. What kind of pattern of the interpretative model – the pattern of mutual 
delimitation or ‘common spaces’ – is most appropriate in the EU-Russia energy rela-
tions and which of them, taking into consideration the existing realities, can be 
reached i.e. what is more likely: the possibility of locating the lowest common de-
nominator or reaching a mutual consensus of the parties to open up their sovereign 
spaces to each other. 
       In my opinion the results of this paper acquired with the help of the innovative 
approach can contribute to a deeper understanding of the EU-Russia energy relations 
and present an alternative reading of the emergence of conflictual issues in the EU-
Russia relations.   
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